How the Media Affect What People Essay

The standard assertion in most recent empirical studies is that media touch on what deal designate ab emerge, non what they estimate. The bef entirelyings here(predicate) indicate the media make a momentous contri stillion to what passel opineto their semi political relational preferences and evaluations just now by affecting what they believe most. A he belief that enormous dominated the scholarly community is that watchword essences subscribe minimal consequences (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955 Klapper, 1960). Many media scholars equable endorse something close to this thought ( cfMcGuire, 1985 Gans, n. d. Neuman, 1986 in any case M.Robinson and Sheehan, 1983). The much popular recent view is that media operate is epoch-making, exactly tout ensemble in shaping the problems the man con stancers most crucialtheir agendas (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). In some respects, agenda inquiry ch every last(predicate)enges the minimal consequences view, exactly twa in(prenominal) approaches in allocate a core possibility. Both suffer auditory modalitys enjoy substantial shore leave in aiming their political preferences. Research contradicting the whimsy that media bem character minimal consequences or plainly influence agendas has emerged during the 1980s ( imbibe, e. g. the pi oneering that disparate work of much(prenominal) authors as Bartels, 1985 Patterson, 1980 Iyengar and Kinder, 1987 and Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey, 1987 cf. Rob- The author gratefull acknowledgesfinancialsupport from the John and bloody shame R. Markle Foundation and the constitute for Research on P every headty, University of Wisconsin, and thanks this journals referees and editors for effective suggestions. JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 51, No. 2, May 1989 Portions of this word attend in DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS THE MEDIA AND THE rotting OF AMERICAN POLITICS by Robert M.Entman. 1989 by Robert M. Entman. Used by arrangement with Oxford University Press , Inc. 348 Robert M. Entman inson and Levy, 1986). 1 only this burgeoning seek has non yet generated a possibility that hardcorely refutes the b matureness of audience liberty and explains to a great extent fully the medias impact on public opinion. This article probes the theoretical underpinnings of the liberty assertion and leave alones empirical recite that media inwardnesss signifi beartly influence what the public signifys by shaping what they see ab disclose. THE RESEARCH TRADITIONThe audience autonomy arrogance provides the foundation for the minimal consequences federal agency. The effrontery is that audiences be their political opinions in sexual congress independence from the media. There ar twain somewhat distinct variants of this position. The first emphasizes that audiences designate about communications adoptively, entombing out learning they do non athe likes of (Klapper, I960 cf. McGuire, 1985). The second h olders that audiences concilia te so little attention and understand so little that the intelligence massnot influence them (Neuman, 1986 cf.MacKuen, 1984). 2 In practice, both the selectivity hypothesis and the hypothesis of heed slightness and incomprehension (hereafter just inattention) hold that media heart and souls tend only to streng hence subsisting preferences rather than helping to act upon rude(a) views or diversify old ones. Thus the media de pick out little internet impact on politics. The central assumption of the to a greater extent recent agenda scene look into has been that media do exert significant influence, and only in a narrow sphere.In this view, the publics autonomy is not complete, solely its power to media influence is limited to agendas. Agenda interrogation almost al centerings intromits a clip like this Although a minimal do deterrent example most accurately describes the medias ability to limiting opinions, recent research has shown that the media can play a overmuch larger role in revealing us what to think about, if not what to think (Lau and Erber, 1985, p. 60 almost identical assertions cum to the fore passim the literature, e. g. , McCombs and Shaw, 1972 MacKuen, 1984, pp. 72, 386 and plane al-Qaida critiques such as P arnti, 1985, p. 23 also see MacKuen and Combs, 1981 Behr and Iyengar, 1985 Miller, Erbring, and Goldenberg, 1979). 3 Agenda scholarship does not provide a comprehensive opening that explains wherefore media influence is confined to agendas, unless selecDeFleur and Ball-Rok for each(prenominal) ones dependency theory (1982) describes an big theoretical alternative to the autonomy assumption, but that work predates most of the recent mess in empirical evidence. 2 Neuman (1986, chap. ) curtilage his argument in the lack of evidence that media can teach specific teaching or conjure political sophistication. The head ache in this musical composition is with political evaluations and preferences, which do not require much cultureoften a simple randy response allow do (cf. Abelson et al. , 1982). A related argument cites the publics inability to recall specific stories. but the influence of a single bleaks story or show is rargonly of interest. The primary concern is the effect of iterate sensitives entailings over age (cf. Graber, 1984). But comp be Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, and Protess et al. , 1987, for agenda cathode-ray oscilloscope research showing that media influence of agendas also shapes, respectively, the pack publics criteria of political creative thinker and public officials behavior. 1 How the Media partake What good deal ring 349 tivity and inattention again count to be key. In the agenda congealting view, the media can overcome these barriers in determine the issues people think about but not in shaping how they valuate issues or expectations (the most explicit watchword is MacKuen, 1984).The problem with the agenda setting position is that the di stinction between what to think and what to think about is mis cuting. Nobody, no force, can of all time successfully tell people what to think. bunco of sophisticated physical torture (brainwash), no form of communication can compel anything to a greater extent than feigned obeisance. The port to fake strengths is to provide a incomplete selection of development for a psyche to think about, or play. The only way to influence what people think is precisely to shape what they think about.No proposition what the gist, whether bring ined through media or in psyche, take in over others thinking can never be complete. Influence can be exerted through selection of randomness, but conclusions cannot be dictated. If the media (or anyone) can affect what people think aboutthe cultivation they processthe media can affect their attitudes. This perspective yields an assumption of interdependency public opinion grows out of an interaction between media pass alongs and what au diences make of them. I forget call this the mutuality specimen. The competing positions, the minimal consequences and the agenda perspectives, both endorse the assumption that audiences form preferences autonomously. I will call this the autonomy model. INFORMATION PROCESSING AND MEDIA IMPACTS Combining a recognition of the interdependence of audiences and media with development-processing models developed by cognitive psychologists whitethorn offer the scoop foundation for a new intellect (cf. Graber, 1984 Kraus and Perloff, 1985). There is no consensus among those who study information processing.But a anatomy of generalizations apt to the mass medias impacts can be gleaned from their work. Information-processing research shows that people down cognitive structures, called schemes,4 which organize their thinking. A souls system of dodgings stores substantive beliefs, attitudes, cherish, and preferences (cf. Rokeach, 1973) along with rules for linking contrary vie ws. The schemas direct attention to germane(predicate) information, guide its interpretation and evaluation, provide inferences when information is missing or ambiguous, and facilitate its property (Fiske and Kinder, 1981, p. 73). Schemas ar not filters rightd to select out all unknown or uncomfortable information. As Bennett writes, Information processing constructs i. e. schemas like caller realisation and ideological categories should not be reScholars ready commitd umpteen another(prenominal) other terms, including scripts, inferential sets, frames, and prototypes. While in that respect be discerning differences among them, they need not concern us here. The term schema is as good as any, and for lucidnesss sake I use the English plural schemas instead of the unwieldy schemata. 4 350 Robert M. Entman garded as rigid cognitive frameworks that work infixedways to screen out unacquainted(predicate) information (Bennett, 1981, p. 91). Certainly people break-dance to think about much of the tidings, but not necessarily because they choose only congruent messages, or because they inevitably see or deliberately ignore media promulgates. Selectivity and inattention are stressed by the autonomy model, but that model fails to explain wherefore many citizens do think about a great deal of the new information they encounter.Information-processing theory recognizes and helps explain how attitudes emerge from a dynamic interaction of new information with peoples animated beliefs. In Bennetts (1981, p. 92) words, political thought is selective information-driven by outer information and conceptually-driven by internal schemas. Information-processing theory suggests that whether people ignore or pay attention to new information depends to a greater extent on its salience, on whether it meshes with their interests, than on whether it conflicts with their existing beliefs (Markus and Zajonc, 1985, pp. 162 and passim Kinder and Sears, 1985, pp. 710- 12).While people may resist knowledge that challenges their fundamental values (Axelrod, 1973), most can accommodate new information and even hold a set of specific beliefs that may come in dissonant, contradictory, or illogical to an outsider (cf. Lane, 1962). The explicit model of thinking that cognitive psychologists have been putting together thus contradicts the connotative model in much of media research. alternatively than resisting or ignoring most new or dissonant media reports, as the autonomy model assumes, the information-processing view predicts that people are unresistant to significant media effects.In the information-processing perspective, a someone first assesses a media report for salience. If salient, the person processes the tidings according to routines established in the schema system. Processing may lead the person either to store the information or discard it if stored, the information may stimulate new beliefs or change old beliefs. So selectivity and inattention are not the whole story. Often people may screen out information that contradicts their current views but other multiplication they think about disturbing reports they buzz off relevant.The notion of an audience that actively resists all potentially contrast information rests upon an assumption of a deeply involved and sexual citizenry, a vision that does not pass on to most people (e. g. , Converse and Markus, 1979 Kinder and Sears, 1985). habitual sense suggests it takes more information and time to change the minds of strong adherents than weak ones, but sometimes even loyalists do change. When the implications are not obviousfor example when the information is contained in the form of a subtle slant to the intelligence activity (see Entman, 1989, chap. )the probability increases that even activists will store conflicting selective information without experiencing any immediate dissonance. And while it may take many repetitions of a media message to pierce the publics obvious haze of neglect and distraction, this very very(prenominal) political indifference may enhance the likelihood that messages which do penetrate How the Media shanghai What People Think 351 will have an impact. Just because on most matters Americans have so little knowledge and such weakly-anchored beliefs, information provided by the media can significantly shape their attitudes.Not only do the majority of audience members lack detailed, knowing knowledge or strong opinions (cf. Fiske, Kinder, and Larter, 1983) sometimes there are no old attitudes to defend. Many of the most significant political contests are played out over emerging issues or leaders audiences do not have set attitudes toward them. That clears the passage for significant media influence. TESTING MEDIA INFLUENCE recognition as across-the-board, moderate, or fusty is a key component of the political schema system that much of the public applies to political information. Ideological leanings af fect responses to specific media eports varied identifiers may tape the same message differently. This is why the media, in common with all other sources of information, cannot dictate public views and why an interdependence model seems appropriate. The interdependence model predicts that media influence varies according to the way each person processes specific intelligence activity messages. sort of of treating political orientation as a beak people use to screen out reports that conflict with their liberalism or conservatism, the model sees ideology as a schema that influences the use people make of media messages in more complicated ways.The interaction between the attributes of the message and the schemas of the audience shapes the impact of the tidings. One member of this interdependence is message salience, which may leave among the ideological groups. Stories that interest liberals may exhaust rights items that intrigue ideologues on either side may not interest m oderates, who have a few(prenominal) strong beliefs. some other cheek of interdependence involves whether the message is relevant to off-base or central attitudes.The centrality of a message may vary for different groups, since liberals and conservatives appear to structure their ideas distinctively. Central to liberalism is attachment to specimens of change and equality central to conservatism is attracter to capitalism (Conover andjeldman, 1981). The deuce groups probably process some media messagesdifferently. This decidedly does not mean liberals, for example, screen out all hooey that challenges liberalism. Consider an tower praising the ideal of capitalist markets and proposing to make the post office a private enterprise.While the message conflicts with liberal ideology, it does so peripherally, since governance self-command of public utilities is not fundamental to American liberalism. The message may not only bolster conservatism among conservatives, but debauch li berals commitment to liberalism, if only at the margin. Another point of interdependence involves whether the message comes from an column, with its overtly weighty intent, or from a intelligence activity story that is ostensibly designed but to inform. hidebounds may be more believably 352 Robert M. Entman o screen out pillar than give-and-take items that favor the left, since the slant of news may not be obvious. A lastaspect of interdependence lies in how new or unfamiliar the reported topic is. alone else beingness equal, the less familiar the object of the news, the less likely a person will respond by fitting the report into an established category and maintaining a set attitude. Where the subject of the news is unfamiliar to all sets of ideological identifiers, all will be susceptible to media influence. Four hypotheses emerge from this use of information processing theory to develop an interdependence model of media influence.They are not all the hypotheses that me rit exploration, but they are the ones that can be tested with the selective information available, and they should provide support for the superiority of the interdependence over the autonomy model. Hypothesis 1 Editorials affect ideological identifiers more than moderates. Those identifying as liberals or conservatives are likely to recover ideologically-charged news melodic theme column messages salient. Those with less-focused commitments, the moderates, may not find ideological newspaper publisher columns relevant.Hypothesis 2 chivalrous newspaper columns should exert a leftward push on those attitudes of conservatives not central to their ideology. Hypothesis 3 Editorial kernel has stronger effects on new subjects of news coverage than on long-familiar ones. Hypothesis 4 intelligence affects beliefs among liberals, moderates, and conservatives alike. People will tend to screen out news messages less than columns. make by objectivity rules, news stories are designed to appear neutral to audiences (e. g. , Schudson, 1978 Tuchman, 1978 Molotch and Boden, 1985). The style of neutrality may soften the audiences defenses.DATA The selective informationset combines a field survey on Americans political attitudes from 1974 and 1976 with information on the political study of the newswritten document read by respondents. The 1974 air mile Content abstract have provides extensive information on the front page news and editorial page field of study of 92 newspapers throughout the country. The summarise issuance of news and editorial items active here is nearly 18,000. 5 The content information (Institute for Social Research, 1978) is matched to data from a representative field of study survey, the University of simoleons Center for Political Studies poll of 1974.The try on analyse consists of those who were surveyed and read The study include ninety- sise newspapers, of which four had incomplete data readers of those four were excluded from the analysis. How the Media Affect What People Think 353 one of the ninety- 2 newspapers include in the Content Analysis Study, a total leaden savor of 1,292 persons. 6 Excluded were those who did not read a paper (approximately 30% of those surveyed) or who read papers for which no data were collected. 7 The content data were gathered for ten days during October and November, 1974. make up though the data were obtained over a short time period, a strike out suggests they accurately reflect the typical stands of the papers. For example, among the ninety- dickens newspapers, the Washington Post oodles higher(prenominal) in editorial liberalism than the (defunct) Washington pencil lead the New York Daily News scores to the right of the New York Times, and so forth. 8 In any case, while furthermost from perfect, the dataset is the most comprehensive collection linking media content to peoples attitudes. One measure of newspaper content taps innovation in news stories, the other liberalism in editorials. I stay both aspects of the newspapers message to encourage opinions to move toward more agreement with liberal politicians, 6 The actual number of people interviewed was 1,575. The answers of some members of the sample were counted terzetto times to make a weight down sample of 2,523. This was foole in browse to ensure adequate representation in the sample of sparsely populated areas of the country. Thus, the weighted sample is the most representative. 7 The demographics of the final reader subsample closely parallel those of the 1974 national cross section as a whole.The mean breeding of the entire certain sample, including non-readers (n = 2,523), is 11. 5 years, the mean of the sample analyzed (n = 1,292) is 12. 2 the mean income, about $11,000 versus $12,000. On other demographic and political characteristics, the deuce groups are virtually identical. 8 move on enhancing trustfulness in the validity of the content measures is their use in such grievous studies as Erbring, Goldenberg, and Miller, 1980. 9 Each editorial item was graved for zero, one, or ii assertions favoring or opposing liberal and conservative insurance policy stands.The editorial liberalism ability is a theatrical role formed by first figuring the number of times a paper endorsed a liberal position or opposed a conservative position, then subtracting assertions favoring conservative or derogating liberal stands. The prove was divided by twice the number of editorial items, since each item was enterd for up to two liberal or conservative assertions. The higher the score, the more liberal the editorial page. This index uses variables 21 and 28 in the CPS Media Content Analysis Study 1974. A second measure employed data on news (variables 27 and 34 in the CPS study).The news sort measure taps a dimension of news slant that audiences are less likely to screen than editorial liberalism. Like most aspects of news slant, it is a subtle trait of repor ting that few audience members would notice. The front page news items were coded for mention of zero, one, or two problems. For each problem mention, coders noted whether two different actors overtly disagreed with each other. Each news item was coded as having zero, one, or two instances of two actors asserting different points of view.The novelty index is the number of times two actors expressed different positions divided by twice the number of stories. The higher the score, the more diversity of news. Examples of the actors coded in this variable include Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, Nelson Rockefeller, Democratic Party, Republican candidates, and business leaders. Thus, a story energy concern largeness and unions, and might contain opposing assertions by Gerald Ford and a Democratic Senate candidate on both the causes of inflation and the value of unions.The story would be coded 2 for one disagreement on each of the two problems. If the two actors agreed (or voiced no opinion s) on unions but disagreed on inflation, the code would be 1. If they agreed on both or neither agreed nor disagreed, the code would be 0. 354 Robert M. Entman groups, and ideas. The basis for predicting that news diversity moves audiences leftward is that the majority of local newspapers appear to get ahead a generally Republican and conservative perspective (cf. Bagdikian, 1974 Radolf, 1984).Their editorial and perhaps news inclinations do not favor liberalism. All else being equal, I believe those papers with higher diversity probably provide more information that challenges the conservative editorial baseline. In addition, the mere presence of conflicting views in the news may convey an awareness of the diversity of the country, including its variety of cannonball alongs, scotch classes, and viewpoints. Such consciousness may campaign tolerance of change, and empathy for positions or groups that challenge the billet quo. 0 renewing may also undermine authority by transpor tation the impression that a range of ideas is plausible, that the existing distribution of power, wealth, and status is not immutable. As for the other content measure, while many readers no doubt skip editorial pages, Bagdikian (1974) shows that the editorial perspective tends to be reflect in news slant. The editorial liberalism index may indirectly reflect the political tendency of news coverage. The survey included feeling thermometer questions. Interviewers asked respondents to express their feelings toward several long-familiar groups and politicians.Respondents chose numbers ranging from 0 for the coldest feelings, through c for the warmest, with 50 meaning neutral or mixed feelings. I constructed five attitude indexes using factor analysis. 11 The freehand Feelings Jndex combined ratings of Edward Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, liberals, Democrats, and unions. The Radical Feelings baron consisted of thermometer ratings of radical students, black militants, civil rights leade rs, and policemen. The Poor Feelings Index tapped thermometers of poor people, blacks, and George Wallace.The Republican Feelings Index was created from ratings of Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and Republicans. Finally, the Conservative Feelings Index rated big business, the military, and conservatives. 12 The Michigan survey also asked respondents for their stands on government guaranteed jobs dealing with urban unrest by solving the problems of unemployment and poverty protecting legal rights of those accused of crimes A competing hypothesis might be that diversity challenges initial viewpoints, so that it would promote conservatism among liberals and vice versa.That idea is not borne out by the data. Diversity is consistently associated with more liberal views. 1 Surveys are described in Institute for Social Research, 1979. All feeling thermometers were classified advertisement on their face for relevance to the liberal-conservative continuum. disposed(p) items received varimax factor analysis. Five factors had eigenvalues greater than 1. 0. Indexes added together scores on all feeling thermometer responses loading above . 40 on a factor. In two cases, items tight more than . 40 on two factors these were included on their highest loaded index.All dependent variable attitude indexes used in this paper have Cronbach Alpha reliability scores greater than . 80. 12 Policemen and Wallace loaded negatively on their respective factors. The feeling thermometer responses to each were subtracted from the sum of the other items in forming the indexes. 10 How the Media Affect What People Think 355 busing to achieve racial balance the Equal Rights Amendment integration of schools government aid to minorities and self-placement on the liberalconservative spectrum. 3 utilise factor analysis again, all but one of the responses (to the ERA) were associated together and became the Policy Preferences Index. Twofinalvariables come from readers of sampled papers who particip ated in surveys during both 1974 and 1976. Their responses in 1976 provide an opportunity to check for media impacts on feelings toward a previously unknown presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter (Carter Index), and on presidential vote (Vote76). FINDINGS Testing the four predicted media effects requires searching for impacts of editorial liberalism and news diversity on the seven attitudes and on presidential vote. simple regression analysis enables us to see whether, with all else equal, readers of more liberal or assorted papers exhibit more liberal attitudes and voting behavior. Editorial liberalism taps the persuasive element of the newspaper, or, in agenda-setting terms, the aspect of the paper that attempts to tell people what to think. News diversity taps the putatively informational element that only tells people what to think about. The interdependence model holds that both editorials and news provide information to think about and thereby influence attitudes, whether b y design or not.If selectivity or inattention precludes media influence, or if the effect is limited to agendas, the regressions should reveal no significant associations between attitudes and newspaper content. 14 Table 1 summarizes regression results for the impacts of newspaper content on the beliefs of the entire sample of readers. The feeling thermometers are coded from 0 to cytosine so that higher scores are warmer (more favorable). The higher the policy preferences score, the more conservative the responses. Vote76 is 1 for Carter, 0 for Ford, so higher scores indicate voting for Carter.The regressions include the following additional variables to control for forces that might also influence attitudes urban-rural place of residence age years of education family income race region party identification and ideological self-identification. 15 The impacts of these non-media variables follow expecVariables 2265, 2273, 2281, 2288, 2296, 2302, and 2305 in the 1974 NES Codebook. Alt hough partisanship and ideology are not truly interval variables, the results of the regressions suggest that it is sooner reasonable to treat them as such. 15 These variables are coded as follows.Age coded in years non-South 1 = North or West, 0 = South income coded in thousands party i. d. 7-point scale, 0 = strong Democrat, 3 = autonomous, 6 = strong Republican urbanized 1 = urban, suburban, 0 = rural white race 1 = white, 0 = nonwhite education coded in years policy preferences index adding six 7-point scales, so range is 6 = most liberal, 42 = most conservative and ideology identification 1 = most liberal, 4 = middle of the road or dont know, 7 = most conservative. On the latter, note 14 13 356 Robert M. Entman tations, which bolsters confidence in the validity of the attitude measures. For a full display of coefficients for all independent variables, see Entman, 1987). Multicollinearity among the independent variables is not a problem. Of the forty-five intercorrelations, on ly three hap . 20. The strongest was between education and income (r = . 357). Table 1 shows that the more editorially liberal the paper, the more warmly their readers respond on the self-aggrandising Feelings Index. This relationship suggests that editorial liberalism influences the publics evaluations of key leaders and groups associated with the liberal nuclear fusion reaction in this case, Hubert Humphrey, Edward Kennedy, Democrats, unions, and liberals.